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Defined Contribution Pensions: 
Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the  
Path of Least Resistance 
I. Introduction
Over the last 20 years, defined contribution pension plans have gradually replaced
defined benefit pension plans as the primary privately-sponsored vehicle to provide retirement 
income.  At year-end 2000, employers sponsored over 325,000 401(k) plans with more than 42 
million active participants and $1.8 trillion in assets.1 
The growth of 401(k)-type savings plans and the associated displacement of defined 
benefit plans have generated new concerns about the adequacy of employee savings. Defined 
contribution pension plans place the burden of ensuring adequate retirement savings squarely on 
the backs of individual employees.  However, employers make many decisions about the design 
of 401(k) plans that can either facilitate or hinder their employees’ retirement savings prospects. 
Although the government places some limits on how companies can structure their 401(k) plans, 
employers nonetheless have broad discretion in the design of their 401(k) plans.   
Making good plan design decisions requires an understanding of the relationship between 
plan rules and participant choices.  In this paper, we analyze a new data set that enables us to 
carefully assess many such relationships.  The data set is compiled from anonymous 
administrative records of several large firms that collectively employ almost 200,000 individuals.  
Many of these companies implemented changes in the design of their 401(k) plans.  These plan 
changes enable us to evaluate the impact on individual savings behavior of institutional variation 
in 401(k) plan rules.  A list of the companies studied in this paper, along with the plan changes or 
other interventions that we analyze, appears in Table 1.2  Appendix A gives a brief description of 
the data analyzed for each company. 
1 See EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits at http://www.ebri.org/facts/1200fact.htm. 
2 To maintain the anonymity of the companies described in this paper, we refer to each of them with letters. 
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Because low employee savings rates have motivated plan administrators to adopt many of 
the 401(k) plan changes that we discuss in the rest of the paper, we start off in Section II with a 
discussion of savings adequacy.  Using new data from a survey that we designed, we find that 
two-thirds of employees believe that they are saving too little and that one-third of these self-
reported under-savers intend to raise their savings rate in the next two months.  By matching 
survey responses to administrative records, we show that employees who report that they save 
too little actually do have low 401(k) saving rates.  However, almost none of the employees who 
report that they intend to raise their savings rate in the next two months actually subsequently do 
so. 
This finding introduces a theme that we return to throughout the paper.  Specifically, at 
any point in time employees are likely to do whatever requires the least current effort: employees 
often follow the “path of least resistance.”  Almost always, the easiest thing to do is nothing 
whatsoever, a phenomenon that we call “passive decision.”  Such passive decision-making 
implies that employers have a great deal of influence over the savings outcomes of their 
employees.  For example, employer choices of default savings rates and default investment funds 
strongly influence employee savings levels.  Even though employees have the opportunity to opt 
out of such defaults, few actually do so. 
In section III, the heart of our paper, we discuss the impact of changes in seven different 
types of plan rules.  In subsection III.1, we show that automatic enrollment in a 401(k) plan 
dramatically raises participation rates, but that the vast majority of employees accept the 
automatic enrollment default contribution rate investment allocation.  By contrast, before 
automatic enrollment was instituted, few employees chose to invest at these defaults. 
In subsection III.2, we discuss the effects of automatic cash distributions for terminated 
employees.  We argue that automatic cash distributions, which are given to terminated 
employees with balances below $5,000, undercut retirement wealth accumulation.  Most 
employees with balances below $5,000 who receive such automatic distributions consume the 
proceeds.  By contrast, most employees with balances above $5,000 leave their money in the 
401(k) plan.  Hence, the automatic cash distributions seem to play a critical causal role in the 
consumption of these low-balance 401(k) accounts. 
In subsection III.3, we discuss different interventions designed to raise employee 
contribution rates.  Benartzi and Thaler (2001b) have shown that employees are willing to 
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commit to automatic schedules of slow 401(k) contribution rate increases, and that committing to 
such a schedule will result in substantially higher 401(k) savings rates after only a few years.  
We report an experiment of our own that shows that a savings intervention that does not include 
such an automatic commitment component is not successful. 
In subsection III.4, we discuss the effects of the employer match rate and the employer 
match threshold (the maximum employee contribution that the employer matches) on savings 
outcomes.  We show that adopting an employer match can increase 401(k) participation, and that 
the match threshold is an important focal point in the selection of employee contribution rates.  
We also show that increasing the match threshold can raise the contribution rates of households 
with relatively low saving rates. 
In subsection III.5, we discuss the impact of changes in eligibility waiting periods on the 
401(k) participation profile (i.e. participation rates plotted against tenure at the job).  We show 
that an increase in the length of wait before 401(k) eligibility period truncates, but does not shift, 
the participation profile. 
In subsection III.6, we discuss mutual fund menus and the role of employer, or 
“company,” stock.  We argue that the menu of asset allocation options and the choice of the 
default asset allocation influence actual asset allocation decisions and portfolio diversification. 
Finally, in subsection III.7 we discuss the role of financial education in the workplace.  
Using data that links employees receipt of financial education to their actual savings behavior, 
we show that although many seminar attendees plan to make 401(k) savings changes, very few 
actually do so.  Thus, while financial education does improve savings outcomes, its effects are 
modest at best. 
We see passive decision-making in many of the behavioral patterns described above.  
Passive decision-making partially explains the powerful influence of defaults, the anchoring 
effects of the match threshold, the remarkable success of automatic schedules of slowly 
increasing contribution rates, and the impact of mutual fund menus on asset allocation decisions. 
We conclude the paper by encouraging employers to implement 401(k) plans that work 
well for decision-makers who often use passive strategies like those described above.  Employers 
and policy-makers need to recognize that there is no such thing as a neutral menu of options for a 
401(k) plan.  Framing effects will influence employee choices, and passive employee decision-
making implies that the default options will often carry the day.  Sophisticated employers will 
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choose these defaults carefully, keeping the interests of both employees and shareholders in 
mind. 
 
II. Savings Adequacy 
In January 2001, we administered a saving adequacy survey to a random sample of 
employees at a large U.S. food corporation (Company A) with approximately 10,000 employees.  
Of these employees, 1,202 were sent an e-mail soliciting their participation in a Web-based 
survey on satisfaction with various aspects of the company-sponsored 401(k) plan.3  Because 
participation in the survey was solicited by e-mail and the survey itself was conducted on the 
Web, the universe of potential respondents is restricted to those with Internet access at work.4 
Our survey had two different versions.  In this section, we discuss the savings adequacy 
version that was sent to 590 of the employees with computers.  From this sample we received 
195 usable responses.  A copy of the complete survey is reproduced in Appendix B, although we 
discuss only a subset of the questions in the analysis below.  In addition to the survey responses, 
we also have administrative data on the 401(k) savings choices of survey respondents both 
before and after the survey.  This includes participation decisions, contribution rates, and asset 
allocation choices from January 1996 through April 2001. 
We first asked respondents to report how much they should ideally be saving for 
retirement.5  The average response is 13.9 percent of income.  We than asked respondents to 
evaluate their actual saving rate.  Two-thirds (67.7 percent) of the respondents report that their 
current savings rate is “too low” relative to their ideal saving rate.6  One-third (30.8 percent) of 
the respondents report that their current savings rate is “about right.”  Only 1 out of 195 
respondents (0.5 percent) reports that his or her current savings rate is “too high.” 
To evaluate how well individual perceptions of saving adequacy correlate with actual 
savings behavior, we report in Table 2 the distribution of actual pre-tax 401(k) savings rates 
                                                          
3 The solicitation included an inducement to actually complete the survey:  two respondents were randomly selected 
to receive gift checks of $250, and one respondent was selected to receive a gift check of $500. 
4 Naturally, restricting our sample to Internet users biases our sample toward employees with greater financial 
sophistication.  Our survey reveals that an employee’s level of Internet experience correlates with his self-reported 
financial knowledge.  Likewise, home Internet access also correlates with financial knowledge. 
5 See question 10 from the survey (Appendix B). 
6 See question 11 from the survey (Appendix B).  For our empirical analysis we aggregate the categories “far too 
low” and “a little too low” into one category (“too low”).  Likewise, we aggregate the categories “far too high” and 
“a little too high” into one category (“too high”). 
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conditional on respondents’ answers to the savings adequacy questions discussed above.  Since 
we use the plan’s administrative records, our analysis of actual 401(k) savings rates does not 
suffer from reporting biases.  We divide the actual pre-tax 401(k) savings rates into three 
categories:  0 to 4 percent of income, 5 to 8 percent of income, and 9 to 12 percent of income.  
Our scale tops out at 12 percent because this is the maximum pre-tax 401(k) contribution rate in 
Company A.  Among the respondents who said that their current savings rate is “too low,” 36 
percent had an actual 401(k) savings rate of 0-4 percent, another 36 percent had a 401(k) savings 
rate of 5 to 8 percent, and 27 percent had a 401(k) savings rate of 9 to 12 percent.  In contrast, 
among those who said that their current savings rate is “about right,” 12 percent had a 401(k) 
savings rate of 0 to 4 percent, 15 percent had a savings rate of 5 to 8 percent, and 73 percent had 
a 401(k) savings rate of 9 to 12 percent.  These comparisons reveal that respondents who report 
that their savings rate is too low do have lower actual savings rates than respondents who report 
that their savings rate is about right.  In the former group the average pre-tax 401(k) contribution 
rate is 5.8 percent of income, in contrast to an average 401(k) savings rate of 9.0 percent in the 
latter group. 
We also asked respondents to describe their plans for the future.  None of our respondents 
expressed an intention to lower their contribution rate.  But 35 percent of the respondents who 
said that their savings rate was too low intended to increase their contribution rate over the next 
few months.  By contrast, 11 percent of respondents who said their savings rate was about right 
intended to increase their contribution rate over the next few months.  Among those who planned 
to raise their contribution rate, over half (53 percent) said that they planned to do so in the next 
month.  Another quarter (23 percent) planned to make the change within two months. 
So far our data shows a familiar pattern.  Respondents report that they save too little and 
that they intend to raise their savings rate in the future.  Other savings adequacy surveys reach 
similar conclusions (Bernheim 1995; Farkas and Johnson 1997).  Our survey is distinguished by 
our ability to cross-check responses against actual 401(k) records.  We have shown that 
respondents who say that their savings rate is too low actually do have substantially lower pre-
tax 401(k) contribution rates.  So their retrospective reports are accurate. 
We have also checked to see whether their forward-looking plans are consistent with 
their actual subsequent behavior.  Of those respondents who report that their savings rate is too 
low and who plan to increase their contribution rate in the next few months, only 14 percent of 
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this subgroup actually do increase their contribution rate in the four months after the survey.  
Hence, we find that respondents overwhelmingly do not follow through on their good intentions.  
In summary, out of every 100 respondents, 68 report that their savings rate is too low; 24 of 
those 68 plan to increase their 401(k) contribution rate in the next few months; but only 3 of 
those 24 actually do so.  Hence, even though most employees describe themselves as undersavers 
and many report that they plan to rectify this situation in the next few months, few follow 
through on this plan. 
Needless to say, these data are hard to interpret.  It’s not clear what subjects mean when 
they say that they save too little.  It’s also not clear what subjects mean when they say that they 
intend to raise their contribution rate in the next few months.  However, this evidence is at least 
consistent with the idea that employees have a hard time carrying out the actions that they 
themselves say they wish to take.  Employers seem to be concerned about such failures.  Many 
of the institutional changes discussed below in Section III were initiated by plan administrators 
in an effort to raise employee savings rates. 
 
III. Seven Institutional Features of 401(k) Plans 
In this section, we turn to an analysis of how several different 401(k) plan features affect 
employee 401(k) savings behavior. 
 
III.1 Automatic Enrollment 
The typical 401(k) plan requires an active election on the part of employees to initiate 
participation.  A growing number of companies, however, have started automatically enrolling 
employees into the 401(k) plan unless the employee actively opts out of 401(k) participation.  
While automatic enrollment is still relatively uncommon, a recent survey indicates that its 
adoption has increased quite rapidly over the past few years.7 
The interest of many companies in automatic enrollment has stemmed from their 
persistent failure to pass the IRS non-discrimination rules that apply to pension plan provision.  
As a result of failing these tests, many companies have either had to make ex post 401(k) 
contribution refunds to highly compensated employees or retroactive company contributions on 
                                                          
7 In a recent survey, Hewitt Associates (2001) reports that 14 percent of companies utilized automatic enrollment in 
2001, up from 7 percent in 1999. 
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behalf of non-highly compensated employees in order to come into compliance.  In addition, 
many companies have tried to reduce the possibility of non-discrimination testing problems by 
ex ante limiting the contributions that highly compensated employees can make.  The hope of 
many companies adopting automatic enrollment has been that participation among the non-
highly compensated employees at the firm will increase sufficiently that non-discrimination 
testing is no longer a concern. 
While some companies have been concerned about the potential legal repercussions of 
automatically enrolling employees in the 401(k) plan, the U.S. Treasury Department has issued 
several opinions that support employer use of automatic enrollment.  The first Treasury 
Department opinion on this subject, issued in 1998, sanctioned the use of automatic enrollment 
for newly hired employees.8  A second ruling, issued in 2000, further validated the use of 
automatic enrollment for previously hired employees not yet participating in their employer’s 
401(k) plan.9  In addition, during his tenure as Treasury Secretary, Lawrence H. Summers 
publicly advocated employer adoption of automatic enrollment.10 
A growing body of evidence suggests that automatic enrollment—a simple change from a 
default of non-participation to a default of participation—substantially increases 401(k) 
participation rates.11  To assess the impact of automatic enrollment on savings behavior, we 
examine the experience of three large companies analyzed in Choi, et al. (2001) that 
implemented automatic enrollment between January 1997 and April 1998.  Companies B and C 
implemented automatic enrollment for new hires.  Company D also implemented automatic 
enrollment for new hires, but in addition, Company D subsequently applied automatic enrollment 
to non-participating employees who were 401(k)-eligible at the time when automatic enrollment 
was initially adopted.12 
                                                          
8 See IRS Revenue Ruling 98-30 (Internal Revenue Service 1998). 
9 See IRS Revenue Ruling 2000-8 (Internal Revenue Service 2000a).  See also Revenue Rulings 2000-33 and 2000-
35 (both Internal Revenue Service 2000b). 
10 See “Remarks of Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers at the Department of Labor Retirement Savings 
Education Campaign Fifth Anniversary Event” at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ps785.htm along with 
related supporting documents. 
11 See Madrian and Shea (2001a), Choi, et al. (2001), Fidelity (2001) and Vanguard (2001). 
12 Because of concurrent changes in eligibility for employees under the age of 40 at Company D, we restrict the 
sample of employees in the analysis at the company to those aged 40 or over at the time of hire.  These employees 
were immediately eligible to participate in the 401(k) plan both before and after the switch to automatic enrollment. 
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Table 3 illustrates the difference in 401(k) participation rates by tenure before and after 
automatic enrollment.  For each company, we report three columns of figures.  The first and 
second columns contain the fraction of employees hired before and after automatic enrollment 
was implemented who are 401(k) plan participants at six-month increments of tenure.13  The 
third column differences these participation rates, yielding the incremental impact of automatic 
enrollment on plan participation. 
In all three companies, 401(k) participation for employees hired before automatic 
enrollment starts out low and increases quite substantially with tenure.  At six months of tenure, 
401(k) participation rates range from 26 to 43 percent at these three companies.  Participation 
rates increase to 50 to 62 percent at 24 months of tenure, and to 65 to 69 percent at 36 months of 
tenure.  The profile of 401(k) participation for employees hired under automatic enrollment is 
quite different.  For these employees, the 401(k) participation rate starts out high and remains 
high.  At six months of tenure, 401(k) participation ranges from 86 to 96 percent at these three 
companies, an increase of 50 to 67 percentage points relative to 401(k) participation rates prior to 
automatic enrollment.  Because 401(k) participation increases with tenure in the absence of 
automatic enrollment, the incremental effect of automatic enrollment on 401(k) participation 
declines over time.  Nonetheless, at 36 months of tenure, 401(k) participation is still a sizeable 
31 to 34 percentage points higher under automatic enrollment. 
While most companies that implement automatic enrollment do so only for newly hired 
employees, some companies have applied automatic enrollment to previously hired employees 
who have not yet initiated participation in the 401(k) plan.  Choi, et al. (2001) show that for 
previously hired employees at Company D, automatic enrollment also substantially increases the 
401(k) participation rate, although the increase in participation is slightly smaller than that seen 
for newly hired employees. Madrian and Shea (2001a) and Choi, et al. (2001) also discuss how 
the effects of automatic enrollment vary across various demographic groups.  While automatic 
enrollment increases 401(k) participation for virtually all demographic groups, its effects are 
                                                          
13 Because of differences in the available data from these companies, the numbers across companies are not directly 
comparable.  For Company C, we have data on 401(k) participation on the data collection dates, and thus the 
numbers in columns 1 and 2 for Company C represent contemporaneous 401(k) participation rates.  For Companies 
B and D, we have data on the date of initial 401(k) participation, and thus the numbers in columns 1 and 2 for 
Companies B and D represent the fraction of employees who have ever participated in the 401(k) plan. 
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largest for those individuals least likely to participate in the first place:  younger employees, 
lower-paid employees, and Blacks and Hispanics. 
One might conclude that since 401(k) participation under automatic enrollment is so 
much higher than when employees must choose to initiate plan participation, automatic 
enrollment “coerces” employees into participating in the 401(k) plan.  However, if this were the 
case, we should expect to see participation rates under automatic enrollment declining with 
tenure as employees veto their “coerced” participation and opt out.  But remarkably few 401(k) 
participants at these companies, whether hired before automatic enrollment or hired after, reverse 
their participation status and opt out of the plan.  In our three companies, the fraction of 401(k) 
participants hired before automatic enrollment who drop out in a 12-month period ranges from 
1.9 to 2.6 percent, while the fraction of participants subject to automatic enrollment who drop out 
is only 0.3 to 0.6 percentage points higher.  To us, this evidence suggests that most employees do 
not object to saving for retirement.  In the absence of automatic enrollment, however, many 
employees tend to delay taking action.  Thus, automatic enrollment appears to be a very effective 
tool for helping employees begin to save for their retirement. 
While automatic enrollment is effective in getting employees to participate in their 
company-sponsored 401(k) plan, it is less effective at motivating them to make well-planned 
decisions about how much to save for retirement or how to invest their retirement savings.  
Because companies cannot ensure that employees will choose a contribution rate or an asset 
allocation before the automatic enrollment deadline, the company must establish a default 
contribution rate and a default asset allocation.  Most employees follow the path of least 
resistance and passively accept these defaults. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of 401(k) contribution rates at our three companies for 
employees hired before and after automatic enrollment.  Because contribution rates may change 
with tenure, for all three companies we have restricted the sample to employees hired before and 
after automatic enrollment with equivalent levels of tenure.14  All three companies match 
employee contributions up to 6 percent of compensation, the “match threshold” in Figure 1.  But 
the default contribution under automatic enrollment is much lower than this—2 percent in 
company B and 3 percent in companies C and D.  Before automatic enrollment, 63 to 79 percent 
                                                          
14 In Company B, the sample is restricted to employees with 24-35 months of tenure; in Company D to those with 0-
23 months of tenure; and in Company D to those with 12-35 months of tenure. 
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of plan participants at these companies contribute at or above the match threshold.  Only 11 to 20 
percent voluntarily choose the contribution rate specified by their employers as the default under 
automatic enrollment.  In contrast, 42 to 71 percent of participants hired under automatic 
enrollment contribute at the default rate, while only 26 to 49 percent contribute at or above the 
match threshold. 
Automatic enrollment has similar effects on the asset allocation of plan participants.  
Figure 2 shows the allocation of 401(k) balances between stocks, bonds and the combination of 
stable value and money market funds.  Once again, because asset allocation may change with 
tenure, we have restricted the sample to employees with equivalent levels of tenure.15  In two of 
the three companies, the default fund under automatic enrollment is a stable value fund, while in 
the third it is a money market fund.  As Figure 2 shows, employees hired before automatic 
enrollment have the majority of their plan assets (53 to 81 percent) allocated to the stock market, 
and only a small fraction of their assets (10 to 18 percent) allocated to stable value or money 
market funds.  These percentages are effectively reversed for employees hired under automatic 
enrollment.  For this group of participants, 48 to 81 percent of assets are invested in stable value 
or money market funds, a group that includes the automatic enrollment default at all three 
companies, and only 16 to 51 percent of assets are invested in the stock market.  Overall, the 
fraction of assets allocated to the stock market falls by 22 to 53 percentage points, while the 
fraction of assets allocated to stable value funds or the money market increases by 31 to 71 
percentage points. Choi, et al. (2001) show that these effects are driven both by the conversion of 
would-be non-participants to the defaults and by employees who would have participated in the 
absence of automatic enrollment but with different elections. 
Given the evidence of delay in the election of 401(k) participation before automatic 
enrollment shown in Table 3, one might speculate that there is the same type of delay in the 
movement away from the default contribution rate and asset allocation under automatic 
enrollment.  Table 4 suggests that this is indeed the case.  At six months of tenure, between 55 
and 73 percent of participants contribute at the default and have their assets invested wholly in 
the default fund.  At 24 months of tenure, the fraction of participants at the default falls to 40 to 
51 percent, and at 36 months of tenure to 44 to 48 percent.  So, with time, employees do move 
                                                          
15 See footnote 14. 
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away from the automatic enrollment defaults.  Nonetheless, after three years, almost half of 
participants are still “stuck” at the default.16 
Taken as a whole, the evidence in this section indicates that defaults can have a powerful 
effect on the nature of individual saving for retirement.  In terms of promoting overall savings 
for retirement, automatic enrollment as structured by most employers is a mixed bag.  Clearly 
automatic enrollment is very effective at promoting one important aspect of savings behavior, 
401(k) participation.  This simple change in the default from non-participation to participation 
results in much higher 401(k) participation rates.  But, like companies B, C, and D, most 
employers that have adopted automatic enrollment have chosen very low default contribution 
rates and very conservative default funds (Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America 2001; 
Vanguard 2001).  These default choices are inconsistent with the retirement savings goals of 
most employees. 
This evidence does not argue against automatic enrollment as a tool for promoting 
retirement saving; rather, it argues against the specific automatic enrollment defaults chosen by 
most employers.  Employers who seek to facilitate the retirement savings of their employees 
need to respond to the tendency of employees to “stick with the default.” Employers should 
choose defaults that foster successful retirement saving when the defaults are passively accepted 
in their entirety.  Automatic enrollment coupled with higher default contribution rates and more 
aggressive default funds would greatly increase wealth accumulation for retirement.17  The 
results in this section also suggest an important caveat in thinking about the design of personal 
accounts in a reformed Social Security system—whatever defaults are chosen will need to be 
chosen carefully. 
 
III.2 Automatic Cash Distributions for Terminated Employees with Low Account 
Balances 
Another aspect of 401(k) plan design that highlights the importance of defaults on 401(k) 
savings outcomes is the treatment of the 401(k) balances of former employees.  When an 
employee leaves a firm, the employee may explicitly request a cash distribution, a direct rollover 
                                                          
16 Choi, et al. (2001) show that compensation is the strongest determinant of how quickly employees move away 
from the automatic enrollment default—highly compensated employees tend to move away from the default more 
rapidly than those with lower pay. 
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of 401(k) balances to an IRA, or a rollover to another employer’s 401(k) plan.  If the terminated 
employee does not make an explicit request, the balances typically remain in the 401(k) plan.  
Under current law, however, if the plan balances are less than $5,000 and the former employee 
has not elected some sort of rollover, the employer has the option of compelling a cash 
distribution. 
To document the importance of this mandatory cash distribution threshold, Figures 3A 
and 3B plot the relationship between the size of 401(k) balances and the likelihood that a 
terminated employee receives a distribution from the 401(k) plan at Companies B and D.  We 
consider the experience of 401(k) participants whose employment terminated any time during 
1999 or January through August of 2000.18  We order the employees according to the size of 
their 401(k) balances and then divide them into groups of 100.  We then calculate the average 
balance size for each group (the x-axis, plotted on a log scale) and the average fraction of 
employees who receive a distribution from the plan by December 31, 2000 (the y-axis).  The 
measure of 401(k) balances used on the x-axis is the average participant balance as of December 
31 of the year prior to the year in which the termination occurred.19  This measure of balances is 
likely to understate the actual balances of plan participants at the time of termination because the 
incremental contributions made to an individual’s account between December 31 of the previous 
year and the date of termination are excluded (as are any capital gains or losses over this time 
period). 
In both companies, around 90 percent of terminated participants with prior year-end 
balances of less than $1,000 receive a distribution subsequent to termination.  In contrast, in 
Company D, a rather constant one-third of terminated participants with year-end balances of 
greater than $5,000 receive a distribution.  In Company B, this fraction is even lower, at about 18 
percent, although there is some additional slight decline in the likelihood of receiving a 
distribution with respect to balance size beyond the $5,000 threshold.  Between $1,000 and 
$5,000 in year-end balances, the fraction of terminated participants receiving a distribution falls 
rather steadily and quite significantly at both companies.  This reflects the decreasing likelihood 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 See section III.3 for another alternative to a higher initial default contribution rate. 
18 This includes both voluntary and involuntary terminations. 
19 That is, employees terminated in 2000 have a balance measure from December 31, 1999, while employees 
terminated in 1999 have a balance measure from December 31, 1998.  We use this measure of balances because it is 
the only measure that we have in our data. 
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that terminated participants will have a final balance of less than $5,000 that is subject to an 
involuntary cash distribution. 
For example, consider an employee at Company D making $40,000 per year who is 
contributing 6 percent of pay to the 401(k) plan with a 50 percent employer match that is vested.  
If this individual leaves his job at the end of August, the additional employer plus employee 
contributions to the 401(k) plan will amount to $2,400.  Assuming no net capital gains or losses, 
this individual will face a mandatory cash distribution if his prior year-end balances were less 
than $2,600 (because $2,400 plus anything less than $2,600 will fall under the $5000 distribution 
threshold).  If his prior year-end balances were higher than $2,600, however, the company would 
not be able to compel a cash distribution because his total balances subsequent to termination 
would exceed $5,000.  Thus, employees with higher prior-year-end balances will be less likely to 
face an automatic distribution upon termination because they are more likely to have had balance 
increases that bring them above the $5,000 threshold. 
Of course, even in the case of an automatic cash distribution, the former employee does 
have the option to roll the account balance over into an IRA or the 401(k) plan of another 
employer, regardless of the size of the account balance.  But previous research suggests that the 
probability of receiving a cash distribution and rolling it over into an IRA or another 401(k) plan 
is very low when the size of the distribution is small.  Instead, these small distributions tend to be 
consumed.20  When employers compel a cash distribution and employees receive an unexpected 
check in the mail, it is much easier to consume the distribution than to figure out how to roll it 
over into an IRA or another employer’s 401(k) plan. 
This default treatment of the account balances of terminated employees provides another 
example of how many individuals follow the path of least resistance.  When balances exceed 
$5,000, the vast majority of employees leave their balances with their former employer, the least 
effort option.  When balances are below $5,000 and are subject to a mandatory cash distribution 
unless the employee elects otherwise, most individuals receive an unsolicited check in the mail 
and then consume the money rather than rolling it over into another type of saving plan—also the 
least effort option. 
                                                          
(continued on the next page) 
20 Poterba, Venti and Wise (1998) report that the probability that a cash distribution is rolled over into an IRA or 
another employer’s plan is only 5 to 16 percent for distributions of less than $5000.  The overall probability that a 
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This analysis suggests that the rollover provisions of the recently passed Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) will indeed have a positive 
impact on retirement savings.  Under the new law, if the account balance is between $1,000 and 
$5,000, employers will no longer be able to compel a cash distribution if a former employee does 
not elect a rollover; rather, employers will be required to establish an IRA on behalf of 
participants if they choose not to maintain these accounts (Watson Wyatt 2001).  Although this 
provision of the law does not take effect until the Department of Labor issues final regulations 
regarding implementation, something that is not required to happen until 2004, firms need not 
wait until then to voluntarily adopt similar measures.  As with automatic enrollment in 401(k) 
plans, default rollovers have also been sanctioned by the IRS.21  Such a change in the default 
treatment of the small balances of terminated employees is a simple step that would further 
enhance the retirement savings plans of many individuals.22 
 
III.3 Automatic Contribution Rate Increases 
One 401(k) plan feature designed to capitalize on the inertia described in sections III.1 
and III.2 is the Save More Tomorrow (SMT) plan developed by Shlomo Benartzi and Richard 
Thaler (Benartzi and Thaler 2001b). Under this plan, participants agree in advance that in the 
absence of explicit action on their part, their 401(k) contribution rate will be increased by a 
certain amount each time they receive a nominal pay raise until it achieves a preset maximum. 
For example, suppose that a worker agrees to have his contribution rate increased by 2 
percentage points each time he gets a raise. If the worker receives one raise in each of the 
following three years, then his contribution rate would rise a total of 6 percentage points over 
this time period.  This plan is carefully constructed to make use of several themes in behavioral 
economics.  By requiring a present commitment for future actions, the SMT plan alleviates 
problems of self-control and procrastination.  And by increasing contributions on dates of future 
salary increases, the effects of loss aversion are mitigated, because workers will see little or no 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cash distribution is rolled over into an IRA or another employer’s plan or invested in some other savings vehicle is 
slightly higher at 14 to 33 percent. 
21 See Revenue Rulings 2000-36 (Internal Revenue Service 2000b). 
22 We should note, however, that previous research also suggests that although small distributions tend to be 
consumed rather than rolled over into other retirement savings vehicles, these small distributions represent a 
relatively small fraction of total retirement savings (Poterba, Venti and Wise 1998).  Thus, while automatically 
rolling such distributions over into an IRA will undoubtedly increase retirement saving, its impact on aggregate 
retirement saving is likely to be modest. 
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reduction in their nominal take-home pay. (This presumes that participants are subject to money 
illusion.) 
 The striking results of the first experiment with the SMT plan are reported in Benartzi 
and Thaler (2001b).  This first experiment was conducted at a mid-size manufacturing company.  
This company, which did not match employee contributions, was experiencing problems in 
getting low-salary workers to participate and contribute at high levels to the 401(k) plan.  To 
combat these problems, the company hired an investment consultant to meet with employees and 
help them plan their retirement savings.  After an initial interview with each employee, the 
consultant would gauge the employee’s willingness to increase his savings rate.  Employees 
judged to have a high willingness to save more would receive an immediate recommendation for 
a large increase in their savings rate.  79 workers fell into this group.  Employees judged to be 
reluctant to save more would be offered the option of enrolling in the SMT plan. 207 workers fell 
into this group.  The version of the SMT plan that was implemented set up a schedule of annual 
contribution rate increases of three percentage points.  This is a relatively aggressive 
implementation, as the annual nominal salary increases at this company were only a little bit 
higher than three percent. 
The results of the experiment show that the SMT plan can have an enormous impact on 
contribution rates. Of the 207 participants offered the SMT plan as an option, 162 chose to 
enroll.  Furthermore, 129 of these 162 (80 percent) stayed with the plan through three 
consecutive pay raises.  At the beginning of the SMT plan, these 162 workers had an average 
contribution rate of 3.5 percent; by the time of their third pay raise, these workers (including 
those that eventually dropped out) had an average contribution rate of 11.6 percent.  Recall that 
these original 207 participants were selected from a larger sample based on their relative 
reluctance to increase their savings rates.  In comparison, 79 workers had indicated a willingness 
to increase their contributions immediately and were never enrolled in the SMT plan; these 
workers increased their average contribution rate from 4.4 percent to 8.7 percent over the same 
time period.  Since it is reasonable to assume that this latter group of workers represents a more 
highly motivated group of savers than the SMT plan participants, the increases by the SMT plan 
participants are very striking.  As a further comparison, consider that the median 401(k) 
contribution rate of participants in 401(k) plans in general is approximately 7 percent of pay 
(Investment Company Institute 2000).  Thus, the SMT plan participants went from half of this 
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median contribution rate before signing up for the SMT plan to a contribution rate 50 percent 
higher three years later. 
Despite the clear success of the SMT plan in increasing contribution rates, there remain 
several important caveats.  First, the plan is not guided by any well-specified model of what ideal 
savings should be.  Even if we accept that cleverly designed commitment devices can enable 
workers to break from suboptimal behavior patterns, these same devices may overshoot the 
optimal targets.  Second, the increases in 401(k) contribution rates may be offset by dissaving 
elsewhere.23  Although 401(k) saving has many advantages, it may still be inefficient if it leads 
participants to increase high-interest credit-card debt.  Also, we do not know how much of the 
additional contributions were later reduced by plan loans or hardship withdrawals.  In a plan that 
does not have an employer match–unlike the one used in the original SMT experiment–it is not 
clear that increasing 401(k) contributions is always a good idea.  Notwithstanding these caveats, 
the SMT plan is certainly a provocative attempt to use behavioral economics to increase savings 
rates, and the early results are highly encouraging and deserve further study. 
Our 401(k) survey (discussed in Section II) sheds light on the mechanisms that make the 
SMT plan work.  We generated two versions of our survey.  One version (already discussed 
above) asked questions about both savings adequacy and intentions regarding planned future 
investment changes (e.g. plans to change the contribution rate and the asset mix).  We call this 
the savings adequacy version.  We also generated a pared down version of the survey that 
contained no questions about either savings adequacy or intentions.  We call this the control 
version.  We randomly assigned the two different versions of the survey to employees and we 
checked to see whether the savings adequacy questionnaire had an impact on subsequent 401(k) 
investment choices.  In other words, we looked to see whether the process of thinking about 
savings adequacy and formulating one’s future savings plans actually led to a greater propensity 
to subsequently increase (or decrease) one’s saving rate. 
It turns out that this attention manipulation had no impact.  In other words, getting 
someone to think about his or her own savings adequacy did not lead to any differential future 
behavior.  This result sheds some light on the success of the SMT plan.  The SMT plan has many 
                                                          
23 See Engen, Gale, and  Scholz (1994, 1996) for a discussion of asset shifting and its consequences for measuring 
401(k) effectiveness.  See Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998b) for evidence that asset shifting effects are not 
large. 
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different effects.  It encourages employees to think about their savings adequacy.  It also sets in 
motion a series of automatic contribution rate increases.  Our survey experiment demonstrates 
that getting employees to think about savings inadequacy is not enough.  Employees also need a 
low-effort mechanism to help them to carry out their plans to increase their contribution rate.  
The SMT plan provides exactly such a tool. 
 
III.4 Matching 
Although automatic enrollment and the SMT plan provide lots of food for thought, they 
are still relatively new 401(k) plan features that have yet to be adopted on a widespread scale.  A 
more common feature of 401(k) plans is the employer match.  For each dollar contributed by the 
employee to the plan, the employer contributes a “matching” amount up to a certain threshold 
(e.g. 50 percent of the employee contribution up to 6 percent of compensation).  Although the 
effects of employer matching on 401(k) participation and contribution rates have been widely 
studied, the conclusions from this research are decidedly mixed.  This derives in part from the 
inherent difficulties associated with identifying the impact of matching on 401(k) savings 
behavior. 
In theory, introducing an employer match should increase participation in the 401(k) 
plan.  In practice, however, it is difficult to disentangle this effect from the potential correlation 
between the savings preferences of employees and the employer match.  For example, companies 
that offer a generous 401(k) match may attract employees who like to save, biasing upward the 
estimated impact of an employer match on 401(k) participation. 
Using cross-sectional data, Andrews (1992), Bassett, Fleming and Rodrigues (1998), 
Papke and Poterba (1995), Papke (1995), and Even and Macpherson (1997) all find a positive 
correlation between the availability of an employer match and 401(k) participation.  The results 
are more varied, however, in studies that attempt to control for the correlation between the 
employer match and other unobserved factors that affect 401(k) savings behavior.  Even and 
Macpherson (1997) use an instrumental variables approach to account for the endogeneity of the 
employer match and still find a large positive impact of matching on 401(k) participation.  
However, it is not clear that the firm characteristics they use as instrumental variables are in fact 
uncorrelated with unobservable employee savings preferences.  Because she uses longitudinal 
data on firms, Papke (1995) is able to include employer fixed effects to account for the 
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correlation between the employer match and other factors that affect savings behavior.  With the 
addition of these fixed effects, the relationship between the employer match and 401(k) 
participation goes away, but these results are difficult to interpret because Papke only observes 
average match rates, not marginal rates.  Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) examine several 
years of individual-level data in a company whose match rate varied from year to year based on 
the company’s prior-year profitability.  They also find no relationship between the match rate 
and 401(k) participation.  However, the transient nature of the match rate changes at this 
company make it difficult to extrapolate these results to the permanent types of match changes 
that most companies are likely to consider. 
 The empirical evidence on matching and 401(k) contribution rates is even less decisive 
than that on 401(k) participation, although in theory the effects here are less straightforward as 
well.  While introducing an employer match where there wasn’t one before should lower the 
contribution rates of employees who were already contributing in excess of the match threshold 
(an income effect), its impact on those previously contributing at or below the match threshold is 
ambiguous (opposing income and substitution effects). The effects would be similar for 
increasing the match rate while maintaining the same match threshold.   Increasing an existing 
non-zero match threshold while keeping the match rate constant should have no effect on people 
contributing below the old threshold; increase contributions for people at the old threshold (a 
substitution effect); have an ambiguous effect for people above the old threshold but at or below 
the new threshold (opposing income and substitution effects); and decrease contribution rates for 
people above the new threshold (an income effect).  
The actual empirical research on matching and 401(k) contribution rates has focused 
largely on the relationship between the match rate and average 401(k) contribution rates.  
Andrews (1992) finds that a higher employer match rate reduces the average 401(k) contribution 
rate; Bassett, Fleming and Rodrigues (1998) find no effect; Papke and Poterba (1995) and Even 
and Macpherson (1997) find a positive relationship; and Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) find 
a small but positive effect of the match rate on average 401(k) contribution rates.  Papke (1995) 
finds a positive effect of the match rate on total employee contributions at low match rates, but a 
negative effect on employee contributions at higher match rates.  These disparate results are 
perhaps not so surprising given that theory has little to say about the impact of the match rate per 
se on the average 401(k) contribution rate. 
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In this paper, we are able to avoid some of the confounds of previous matching studies by 
examining the individual behavior of participants before and after permanent changes in the 
401(k) match structure at two companies.  In these natural experiments, participant behavior 
before the changes serves as a control for participant behavior after the changes.  We also 
examine the effect of matching on the distribution of 401(k) contribution rates rather than on the 
average 401(k) contribution rate and show the importance of considering the match threshold, a 
facet of employer matching largely ignored in previous research, as well as the match rate. 
The first company that we consider, Company E, increased its match threshold on 
January 1, 1997, while keeping its match rate constant.  Before that time, union workers received 
a 50 percent match on the first 5 percent of income contributed to the 401(k) plan, while 
management employees received a 50 percent match on the first 6 percent of income.  On 
January 1, 1997, the match threshold for union employees increased to 7 percent, while that for 
management employees increased to 8 percent.  Contributions up to the new threshold were still 
matched at 50 percent, although the match on the incremental 2 percent of the new threshold was 
invested in employer stock while the match up to the old threshold had been, and continued to 
be, invested at the discretion of the employee. 
To examine the impact of this change in the match structure on 401(k) savings behavior, 
we utilize a combination of both longitudinal and cross-sectional data.  We have longitudinal 
data on the 401(k) contribution rate in effect on each day from March 31, 1996 to February 28, 
2000 for every worker who was enrolled in the 401(k) plan during that time. We also have cross-
sections of all active employees at Company E at year-end 1998, 1999, and 2000 that contain 
information on participation status, original enrollment date, original hire date, and 
demographics. 
In order to assess the effect of the threshold change on participation, we estimate a Cox 
proportional hazard model of time from hire until the date of initial participation in the 401(k) 
plan.  We control for gender and age (with both linear and quadratic terms), and also include a 
dummy variable that equals 1 after the new threshold took effect (January 1, 1997).  We exclude 
all employees hired before January 1, 1996 because the company eliminated its length-of-service 
requirement for 401(k) participation on that date. We also exclude employees hired after 
December 31, 1997 because the company switched from a traditional defined benefit to a cash-
balance pension plan at that time for newly hired employees. The first column of Table 5 
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presents the estimated hazard ratios associated with each independent variable.  As one might 
expect for a change that does not affect the marginal incentives to participate in the 401(k) plan, 
we find that this increase in the match threshold has no significant effect on 401(k) participation. 
We next look at the impact of the threshold change on 401(k) contribution rates.  Figure 4 
plots the distribution of contribution rates over time for all workers who were contributing to the 
401(k) plan on March 31, 1996.  As workers leave the firm, they are dropped from the sample.  
The switch from the old threshold to the new threshold is clearly apparent.  There is an 
immediate jump from the old threshold to the new threshold when the change occurred in 
January 1997, and a continued slower adjustment over the next three years as more and more 
people shift from the old to the new threshold.  This suggests that there is a strong substitution 
effect for contributors at the old threshold.  In contrast, the fraction of participants at the other 
contribution rates is fairly stable over this entire time period, implying only a very small income 
effect for contributors above the old threshold. 
The shift in contribution rates from the old to the new match threshold may also reflect an 
“anchoring effect” of the match threshold.  Specifically, the match threshold serves as a salient 
starting point in the decision of which contribution rate to select.  Numerous studies have shown 
that final decisions tend to be anchored by such starting points (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). 
The second company that we consider is Company F, which introduced a 25 percent 
match on contributions up to 4 percent of income on October 1, 2000.  We suspect that this was 
adopted as a response to the fact that at year-end 1999, only 34 percent of its active employees 
had ever participated in its 401(k) plan.24  Communication about the change started at the 
beginning of July 2000.  Prior to this date, there was no employer match offered in the plan.25 
Our data include cross-sections of all active employees at Company F at year-end 1998, 
1999, and 2000.  These data contain information on participation status, original enrollment date, 
effective year-end contribution rate, original hire date, and demographics.  We exclude all 
employees hired before July 1, 1998 because on that date the company eliminated a one-year 
length-of-service requirement for 401(k) eligibility. 
                                                          
24 We should note that Company F has a primary defined benefit pension plan for its employees. 
25 The company did have three acquired divisions that had employer matches previously and were not affected by 
this change. These divisions, as well as three divisions that were acquired after 1998, are excluded from our 
analysis. 
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 To assess the impact of the employer match on 401(k) participation, we again estimate a 
Cox proportional hazard model of time from hire until the date of initial participation in the 
401(k) plan.  As with company E, we control for gender and age, and we include a dummy 
variable that equals 1 after the match was announced to employees (July 2000).  Results are 
presented in column 2 of Table 5.  We find that introducing the match has a positive and highly 
significant effect on participation, with a z-statistic of 6.84.  In order to assess the economic 
significance of the results, we plot in Figure 5 the predicted participation rate by tenure for a 
hypothetical population of 40-year-old males.  At three to four months of tenure, the model 
predicts a 10.9 percent participation rate when there is an employer match, which is 3.4 
percentage points higher than would be the case without an employer match.  Results at longer 
tenure levels are more speculative because we don’t actually observe employees with more than 
three months of tenure who have had the match in place since hire.  Keeping this caveat in mind, 
we see that the model predicts 17.8 percent participation at one year after hire with an employer 
match (a 5.3 percentage point increase) and 24.2 percent participation at two years of tenure (a 
7.0 percentage point increase). 
Although these numbers may seem small, note that this company had unusually low 
participation rates to start with.  When compared against the baseline, the employer match 
appears to have increased 401(k) participation by over 40 percent.  Furthermore, relative to the 
match structure in other 401(k) plans, this employer match is not particularly generous.26  A 
higher match rate might be expected to have a larger effect on participation.27 
 The introduction of a match seems to have had a meaningful effect on the distribution of 
contribution rates as well.  Figure 6 is a histogram of contribution rates by hire cohort at the end 
of the calendar year in which the cohort was hired.28  Before the employer match, the most 
frequently chosen contribution rates of plan participants are 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent 
(which is lumped together with the 11 to 14 percent rates in the graph).  After the employer 
match, we see a large increase in the fraction of employees with a 4 percent contribution rate, the 
                                                          
(continued on the next page) 
26 The modal employer match is 50% of employee contributions up to 6% of compensation (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1998). 
27 However, Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998) conclude that the mere presence of a match increases 
participation, with no marginal effect from increasing the match rate.  We cannot test this hypothesis with our data. 
28 While the distribution of employees at the various contribution rates is based on the full sample of employees, not 
just plan participants, we have excluded the non-contributors from the graph because they constitute over 90 percent 
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new match threshold, relative to previous cohorts with the same level of tenure at the company.  
This is consistent with our previous observation that the match threshold may serve as a 
powerful focal point in employees’ choice of a contribution rate. 
In sum, our limited evidence suggests that employer matching does have a significant 
impact on both 401(k) participation and contribution rates.  Company F demonstrates that 
implementing an employer match can increase 401(k) participation.  Company E demonstrates 
that increasing the match threshold can increase 401(k) contribution rates.  Both Company E and 
Company F show that the level of the match threshold has an important effect on the distribution 
of 401(k) contribution rates, with many participants clustering at the match threshold. 
 
III.5 Eligibility 
 Another common 401(k) plan feature is a waiting period before employees become 
eligible to participate in the 401(k) plan.  Employers adopt eligibility requirements for a variety 
of reasons, including the fixed costs of administering accounts for newly hired workers with high 
turnover rates, and because low participation rates of newly hired employees may adversely 
affect an employer’s non-discrimination testing.  This latter explanation, however, is less 
relevant as recent legislative changes have made it easier for companies to institute shorter 
length-of-service requirements for 401(k) participation without substantially increasing the 
company’s risk of failing non-discrimination tests.   
Earlier eligibility is valuable for employees since a shorter waiting period increases their 
tax-deferred savings opportunities.  The extent of this benefit, however, depends on how waiting 
periods affect the participation profile, the relationship between 401(k) participation and tenure.  
For example, waiting periods may merely truncate the participation profile, so that upon 
eligibility, employee participation quickly catches up to the participation rate that would arise 
without a waiting period.  Alternatively, waiting periods may shift the participation profile, so 
that employees who face a waiting period have permanently lower 401(k) participation rates than 
those who do not. 
In this subsection, we examine the effect of eligibility requirements on 401(k) 
participation in two companies that eliminated their eligibility requirements.  Both Company F 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the sample, and including them makes variation in contribution rates across the contributing population difficult 
to see. 
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and Company G went from a one-year eligibility period to immediate eligibility—Company F on 
July 1, 1998, and Company G on January 1, 1997.29 
 To illustrate the impact of waiting periods on 401(k) participation, we plot in Figures 7A 
and 7B the 401(k) participation profiles of employees who faced either a one-year or no 
eligibility requirement.  For Company F (Figure 7A), the two groups are employees hired 
between July 1, 1996 and July 1, 1997 with a full one-year waiting period, and employees hired 
between July 1, 1998 and December 31, 2000, who faced no waiting period.  For Company G 
(Figure 7B), the two groups are employees hired between January 1, 1995 and January 1, 1996 
with a full one-year waiting period, and employees hired between January 1, 1997 and December 
31, 1999 with no waiting period. 
 At both companies, the employees with a one-year waiting period do not immediately 
attain the 401(k) participation levels achieved at equivalent tenure levels by employees with 
shorter waiting periods, but this gap closes fairly quickly over time.  If we assume that the 
participation series are drawn independently, the differences between the two groups are no 
longer statistically significant at 18 months of tenure in Company F and at 22 months of tenure 
in Company G.   
Another way to look at these participation profiles is to consider participation rates by the 
time since 401(k) eligibility.  Doing so, we see that conditional on time since becoming eligible, 
employees with a one-year eligibility requirement actually have a higher 401(k) participation rate 
than employees who were immediately eligible.  The difference in participation rates is between 
2.5 and 4.6 percentage points for Company F and always significant at the 1 percent level for the 
first twelve months after eligibility.  At Company G the difference is approximately 7 percentage 
points and is almost always significant at the 1 percent level for the first 24 months after 
eligibility.  These findings are inconsistent with the notion that eligibility requirements simply 
shift the 401(k) participation profile without affecting its shape. 
 Overall, the evidence from these two companies suggests that the 401(k) participation 
rates of employees who face eligibility requirements catch up fairly quickly (within a matter of 
months) to levels that would occur without waiting periods.  While this is certainly better for 
                                                          
(continued on the next page) 
29 Company G also subsequently changed the windows in which participants could enroll in the plan.  Prior to 
September 1, 1997, participants could enroll only once a month.  Beginning on November 22, 1997, however, new 
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retirement wealth accumulation than would be the case if eligibility requirements resulted in 
permanently lower 401(k) participation rates, we do not take this as evidence to suggest that 
waiting periods are “not that bad.”  Nobody seems to lose when shorter waiting periods are 
adopted, so we see no reason why companies should not be encouraged to allow immediate 
eligibility for participation in 401(k) savings plans. 
 
III.6 Asset Allocation Choices 
The bulk of this paper is focused on the 401(k) participation and contribution decisions of 
employees.  If we are concerned about savings adequacy at retirement, the questions of “whether 
to participate in a savings program” and “how much to save conditional on participation” are of 
primary importance.  After these two questions have been answered, the next most important 
question is “how to allocate savings among different asset classes.”  A small but growing 
literature has addressed these questions in recent years; not surprisingly, many of the same 
behavioral issues present in the participation and contribution decisions also play a role in 
participants’ asset-allocation choices.  As discussed earlier, Madrian and Shea (2001a) and Choi, 
et al. (2001) show that automatic enrollment results in many participants remaining at the 
employer-specified default for both the contribution rate and asset allocation. 
Such passive decision-making in asset allocation choices is also present in many other 
guises.  In a series of papers, Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler demonstrate several related 
behavioral regularities in asset-allocation decisions.  Benartzi and Thaler (2001a) study the 
relationship between the menu of investment choices and the eventual pattern of asset holdings 
across different classes.  They suggest that participants use naive diversification strategies that 
are heavily influenced by the menu offered by their plan; a plan sponsor that offers ten equity 
options and five non-equity options may be subtly influencing its employees to put two-thirds of 
their money into equities.  Using a database of 170 retirement savings plans, Benartzi and Thaler 
(2001a) find that approximately 62 percent of the funds offered in these plans are equity 
investments; the fraction of total assets held in equities by the participants in these 170 plans is 
remarkably close to 62 percent as well.  Furthermore, they find a positive relationship at the plan 
level between the fraction of equity funds offered by the plan and the fraction of individual 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
enrollments were allowed on a daily basis.  To the extent that these deadline changes affect the time path of 
participation, Company G’s results could be biased. 
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portfolios invested in equities.  These findings are further reinforced by experimental data and by 
evidence on individual decisions made by TWA pilots in their corporate plan.  
 In another study, Benartzi and Thaler (2001c) gave participants a choice between the 
distribution of retirement outcomes implied by the actual asset allocation in their 401(k) plan and 
the distribution implied by the average allocation among all participants in the same plan.  Most 
participants preferred the average distribution to the one based on their own allocation.  Since 
most participants have portfolios that are, almost by definition, more extreme than the average 
allocation, Benartzi and Thaler characterize this result as an example of an aversion to 
“extremeness.”  Such results call into question whether most participants are choosing an 
allocation that could be called optimal in an economic framework. 
 Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of 401(k) participants’ asset allocation choices is the 
large fraction of balances invested in employer stock.  About half of all 401(k) plans (by assets) 
offer participants the opportunity to invest in company stock.  Some plans even require that all 
matching contributions be held in company stock, at least for some period of time.  Because this 
asset class is both very volatile (since it consists of only a single stock) and highly correlated 
with the labor earnings of employees, holding company stock is certainly a poor diversification 
strategy for participants.  Nevertheless, a significant fraction of plan assets are held in company 
stock.  For firms that offer company stock in their plans, Holden, VanDerHei, and Quick (2000) 
find that about 33 percent of plan assets are held in this asset class.  Among all firms, including 
those that do not offer company stock, this fraction is 18 percent.   
 While this level of holdings itself seems high, the manner in which participants decide to 
invest in company stock is also troubling.  Benartzi (2001) finds that current contributions to 
company stock are heavily influenced by the returns earned by that stock over the preceding ten 
years.  It seems that naive diversification is combined with naive extrapolation of past returns 
and an apparent lack of concern for the risk consequences of company stock investment.  Indeed, 
a first-order improvement in diversification could be gained by the simple elimination of 
company stock from 401(k) plans. 
Interestingly, ERISA restricts the investments of defined benefit pension plans in the 
stock or real estate of the employer to 10% of total assets.  401(k) plans, however, are exempt 
from this rule.  The combination of large-scale layoffs and the stock market decline after April 
2000 has finally brought some public attention to the diversification danger of company stock in 
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401(k) plans.  401(k) industry professionals are watching with great interest a recent class-action 
lawsuit brought by participants in Lucent’s 401(k) plan.  As reported by the trade publication 
Pensions & Investments, the suit claims that “Lucent tried to induce plan participants to invest in, 
or maintain investments in, company stock, even though certain company officers knew of 
serious business problems that made Lucent stock an inappropriate investment since year-end 
1999.”30  Lucent stock fell over 90 percent from the end of 1999 to mid-2001, and as late as mid-
2000, over 40 percent of Lucent’s 401(k) plan assets were still invested in Lucent stock.  This 
lawsuit has led other companies to reconsider the emphasis of company stock in their 401(k) 
plans, with some considering the elimination of matching in company stock, and other the 
elimination of its availability as an investment option altogether.  A successful lawsuit by 
Lucent's plan participants may finally catalyze a nationwide reponse to the problem of 
inappropriate diversification. 
 
III.7 Financial Education at the Workplace 
Recognizing that many employees are ill-equipped to make well-informed retirement 
savings decisions, particularly with respect to asset allocation, many employers have turned to 
various forms of financial education provision to help their employees meet the challenges of 
planning for an economically secure retirement.  These efforts, which vary widely across 
employers, run the gamut and include paycheck stuffers, newsletters, summary plan descriptions, 
seminars, individual consultations with financial planners, and more recently, access to Internet-
based education and planning tools. 
The previous literature on the effects of financial education on savings behavior has 
found rather consistent evidence that financial education positively impacts savings behavior, 
although the inadequacy of the data in many of these studies makes their conclusions somewhat 
speculative.  There are two broad strands in the literature.  The first is case studies of the impact 
of financial education at specific companies or organizations.  These studies typically evaluate 
the effect of a particular financial education initiative, often financial education seminars, on 
either savings behavior or measures of financial well being (Kratzer et al. 1998; HR Focus 2000; 
DeVaney et al. 1995; McCarthy and McWhirter 2000; Jacobius 2000).  While all of these studies 
                                                          
30 This quote and data on Lucent’s plan are taken from Pensions and Investments, Sept. 3rd, 2001, Page 10. 
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conclude that financial education motivates improvements in savings behavior, these conclusions 
are often based on dramatic changes in what participants plan to do with respect to retirement 
saving without actually verifying that the prophesied changes eventually do take place.  
Unfortunately, a growing body of both theoretical and empirical evidence, including the survey 
results reported in Section II of this paper, suggests that despite the best intentions of employees, 
retirement saving is one area in which individuals excel at delay (Madrian and Shea 2001a; 
O’Donoghue and Rabin 1998; Diamond and Koszegi 2000; Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman 
1998).  Thus, measures of intended behavior are likely to dramatically overstate the actual effects 
of financial education. 
The second broad category of analyses in the previous literature on financial education 
has utilized cross-sectional surveys of individuals from across the population, not just from a 
single company or organization (Bernheim and Garrett 1996; Bernheim, Garrett and Maki 1997; 
Milne, Vanderei and Yakaboski 1995), or data from surveys of multiple employers (Bayer, 
Bernheim and Scholz 1996; Milne, Vanderei and Yakaboski 1996; Murray 1999).  This category 
of studies has the advantages of applying to a general population and utilizing actual savings 
choices instead of savings intentions. 
However, the cross-sectional datasets also pose numerous problems.  The greatest 
drawback to these datasets is that financial education provision and/or utilization may be 
correlated with other factors that have a strong influence on savings behavior across individuals 
or organizations (e.g. the structure of the 401(k) plan, the availability of other types of savings 
and/or pension programs, the level and structure of employee compensation, the corporate 
culture).  To the extent that these confounding factors are not completely observed and 
controlled for, the measured effects of financial education could be quite biased.  The definition 
of what constitutes “financial education” is also subject to interpretation and is likely to vary 
from one respondent to another. 
The household surveys have the additional disadvantage that survey answers to questions 
about financial education are likely to be subject to recall bias.  This could result, for example, if 
individuals who participate in and benefit the most from employer-sponsored savings programs 
find financial education more salient and are thus more likely to remember that such programs 
were offered.  This type of non-random measurement error in the “availability” of financial 
education will lead to estimates of the effects of financial education that are too large.  The 
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employer-based surveys have the additional disadvantage that response rates tend to be quite 
low, and it is unlikely that the non-response is random.  Moreover, it is almost impossible to 
determine how the selection of the firms into the sample is likely to impact the results. 
A recent study by Madrian and Shea (2001b) examines the impact of financial education 
seminars on savings behavior in Company C, one of the companies discussed in section III.1.  
Company C enlisted a financial education provider to give one-hour seminars at its various 
locations throughout the country during 2000.  The curriculum at these seminars was general in 
nature, and covered topics directly related to retirement savings such as setting savings goals to 
meet retirement income targets and the fundamentals of investing (asset classes, risk, 
diversification, etc.), in addition to more general financial issues such as managing credit and 
debt and using insurance to minimize exposure to financial risks. 
The financial education data from this company are unique in that seminar attendance 
was tracked in a way that made it possible to match seminar attendance to administrative data on 
both previous and subsequent savings behavior.  We have data the individuals who attended 
financial education seminars between January 1 and June 30, 2000, and on the 401(k) savings 
choices of all employees at this company on December 31, 1999, before any of the seminars 
were offered, and on June 30, 2000, by which time the seminars had been offered at 42 different 
locations.  One-third of the employees at the company work at these 42 locations, and about 17 
percent of employees at these locations attended the financial education seminars. 
Table 6 presents some very basic statistics on the planned changes in savings behavior 
that attendees of the financial education seminars reported, along with the actual changes in 
savings behavior that were made subsequent to the seminars.  The statistics in Table 6 paint a 
somewhat more muted picture of the impact of financial education on savings behavior than has 
been estimated in the previous literature.  In an evaluation of the financial education seminars 
given to attendees at the conclusion of the seminar, attendees were asked, “After attending 
today’s presentation, what, if any, action do you plan on taking toward your personal financial 
affairs?,” followed by a list of choices (with multiple responses allowed).  71 percent of those 
attending the seminars filled out and turned in these evaluation forms.31 
                                                          
(continued on the next page) 
31 The evaluation responses that we have are from all locations offering financial education seminars during 2000, 
not just those offering the seminars during the January-June 2000 period for which we have savings data.  
Unfortunately, we do not have the evaluation responses on an individual basis, only the aggregrated responses for all 
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Of those who filled out the evaluation, 12 percent reported that they intended to start 
contributing to the 401(k) savings plan.  But 88 percent of seminar attendees were already 
participating in the 401(k) plan, so virtually all of the non-participating seminar attendees 
planned to enroll in the 401(k) plan.  By June 30, 2000, however, only 14 percent of the non-
participating seminar attendees had actually joined the plan, and some of these individuals would 
likely have enrolled in the 401(k) plan without the availability of a financial education seminar 
(as did 7 percent of the employees who did not attend the seminars). 
Of those seminar attendees who were already participating in the plan, 28 percent 
reported plans to increase their 401(k) contribution rate, 41 percent reported plans to make 
changes in the selection of their investment choices within the 401(k) plan, and 36 percent 
reported plans to change the fraction of their money allocated to the various 401(k) investment 
choices.  By June 30, 2000, however, only 8 percent of 401(k) participants attending the 
seminars had increased their contribution rate, while 15 percent had made changes to their 
investment choices and 10 percent had changed their fund allocations.  While the fraction of 
seminar attendees making such changes is slightly higher than the fraction of non-seminar 
attendees, it is substantially below what the attendees reported they planned on doing.  One could 
certainly argue that the low rate of actual changes relative to planned changes results from the 
fact that the data used to observe the plan changes is, for employees at some locations, not long 
after the actual financial education seminars.  However, there is relatively little correlation 
between the fraction of seminar attendees making changes to their 401(k) savings behavior and 
the length of time between their seminar and June 30, 2000.  It appears that seminar attendees 
either make changes almost immediately or not at all. 
Madrian and Shea (2001b) draw similar conclusions when they try to control for differences 
in the underlying savings propensities of employees who do and do not attend financial 
education seminars.  Their final assessment is that financial education increases savings plan 
participation and results in greater portfolio diversification, particularly among employees hired 
under automatic enrollment, but the estimated magnitudes are not particularly large.  Overall, 
while financial education is important, it does not appear to be a powerful mechanism for 
encouraging 401(k) retirement savings. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
attendees.  Thus, we cannot ascertain on an individual basis how many seminar attendees actually followed through 
on the planned behaviors listed on the evaluation form. 
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 IV. Conclusions 
 The evidence discussed above provides an incomplete sketch of the retirement 
preparation process.  Our analysis only covers 401(k) savings and necessarily misses other 
important types of wealth like home equity, IRAs and defined benefit pensions.  However, even 
our incomplete evidence provides intriguing hints about the economic and psychological forces 
that drive financial planning. 
Most of our evidence highlights the importance of passive decision-making.  For better or 
for worse, many households appear to passively accept the status quo.  For example, in 
companies without automatic enrollment, the typical employee takes over a year to enroll in his 
or her company-sponsored 401(k) retirement plan.  In companies with automatic enrollment, 
employees overwhelmingly accept the automatic enrollment defaults, including default savings 
rates and default funds.  For terminated employees, the key determinant of whether they 
consume or save their 401(k) balances is whether that balance is above or below the automatic 
cash distribution threshold of $5,000.  Many plan participants allow the menu of investment 
funds to drive their asset allocation decisions.  Most employees feel that they save too little, and 
many plan to raise their contribution rate in the near future, but few act on these good intentions.   
By contrast, employees do succeed in raising their contribution rates if they are given a low-
effort opportunity to sign up for an automatic schedule of increases in their contribution rate. 
All of these examples have a common theme:  employees often take the path of least 
resistance.  As a result, employers have a large measure of control over the savings choices that 
their employees make, and employers cannot escape this responsibility.  Whatever savings plan 
an employer creates necessarily advantages certain passive or nearly passive choices over other 
active choices.  Sophisticated employers should choose their plan defaults carefully, since these 
defaults will strongly influence the retirement preparation of their employees. 
Policy-makers should also recognize the role of defaults, since policy-makers can 
facilitate, with laws and regulations, the socially optimal use of defaults.  For example, default 
contributions to company stock may lead to insufficient diversification.  Policymakers could 
legally cap default investments to such problematic asset categories.  Likewise, policymakers 
could facilitate default contributions to more appropriate investments, like the S&P 500, by 
giving corporations legal protections for picking such risky but highly diversified default funds. 
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It is easy to identify dozens of ways that thoughtful regulations can influence passive 
decision-makers without encroaching on the freedom of active decision-makers to opt out of the 
defaults and choose in their own (perceived) best interest.  However, regulating defaults is a two-
edged sword.  If one has confidence in the government, then such regulations will serve the 
common good.  If one does not have such confidence, then regulating defaults will open up one 
more avenue for the misuse of governmental power.  Our analysis demonstrates that defaults 
matter, but our evidence does not reveal who should control them. 
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Appendix A:  Data 
 
This Appendix describes the data for each of the companies analyzed in this paper. 
 
Company A.  1) Cross-sectional survey data from January 2001 for a random sample of 
employees; 2) Longitudinal 401(k) savings data from January 1996 through April 2001 for all 
401(k) participants. 
 
Company B.  Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December 31 of 1998, 1999 and 
2000 for all active employees (both 401(k) participants and non-participants) and non-employee 
401(k) plan participants. 
 
Company C.  1) Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from June 1, 1997; December 31, 
1997; June 30, 1998; December 30, 1998; March 31, 1999; June 30, 1999; September 30, 1999; 
December 31, 1999; March 31, 2000; and June 30, 2000 for all active employees; 2) Financial 
education seminar attendees from January 1, 2000 through June 30, 2000. 
 
Company D.  Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December 31 of 1998 and 1999 
for all 401(k) plan participants (employee and non-employee), and from December 31, 2000 for 
all active employees (both 401(k) participants and non-participants) and non-employee 401(k) 
plan participants. 
 
Company E.  1) Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December 31 of 1998, 1999 
and 2000 for all active employees (both 401(k) participants and non-participants) and non-
employee 401(k) plan participants; 2) Longitudinal 401(k) savings data from March, 1996 
through March, 2000. 
 
Company F. Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December 31 of 1998, 1999 and 
2000 for all active employees (both 401(k) participants and non-participants) and non-employee 
401(k) plan participants. 
 
Company G.  Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December 31, 1999 for all active 
employees (both 401(k) participants and non-participants) and non-employee 401(k) plan 
participants. 
  
 The cross-sectional data available for these various companies include basic demographic 
information (age, hire date, gender, income), as well as point-in-time information on 401(k) 
saving such as participation status, contribution rate, account balances, and asset allocation. 
 
 The longitudinal data includes daily information on the 401(k) contribution rate, account 
balances, and asset allocation of 401(k) plan participants.  It does not include demographic 
information or information on non-participating employees. 
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Appendix B: 401(k) plan Participant Satisfaction Survey Questions 
 
 
Section I 
 
1. Which of the following statements describes your current participation in the XXX 
Company, Inc. 401(k) Plan? 
 
 I am currently contributing to the plan 
 I am not currently contributing to the plan, but I have previously contributed to the plan 
 I am not currently contributing to the plan, and I have never contributed to the plan 
 
 
2. For each of the following questions, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree 
with respect to the XXX Company, Inc. 401(k) plan. To indicate your level of agreement, 
please use the following scale (if you have no experience with a given item, please respond 
with “have no opinion”). 
 
Strongly agree 
Somewhat agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Have no opinion  
 
a. I have a good understanding of the 401(k) savings plan overall 
b. I have a good understanding of the 401(k) savings plan investment fund choices 
c. I think the 401(k) plan meets my needs 
d. The XXX Company, Inc. 401(k) plan is better than plans offered by other companies 
 
3. For each of the following questions, please indicate how satisfied you are with that aspect 
of the XXX Company, Inc. 401(k) plan. To indicate your level of satisfaction, please use the 
following scale (if you have no experience with a given item, please respond with “have no 
opinion”). 
 
Very satisfied 
Somewhat satisfied 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Somewhat dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Have no opinion 
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 a. Convenience of payroll deductions for savings 
b. Number of investment options 
c. Variety of investment options 
d. Account Statements 
e. Internet access to your 401(k) plan 
f. Loans 
 
Please use the space provided to fill in your response to the following question:  
 
4. What, if anything, could your company do differently in terms of the XXX Company, 
Inc. 401(k) plan that would increase your satisfaction level, relating to any of the items 
listed above?  
 
 
 
 
 
Section II 
  
Please check the appropriate box for each of the following questions: 
 
5. How would you describe yourself as an Internet user? 
 
  Very experienced 
  Somewhat experienced 
  Not too experienced 
  Not at all experienced 
 
 
6. Do you have access to the Internet at home? 
 
  Yes 
  No 
 
 
7. How would you describe your level of financial knowledge? 
 
  Very knowledgeable 
  Somewhat knowledgeable 
  Not too knowledgeable 
  Not at all knowledgeable 
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8. Which of the following best describes your job? 
 
  Management 
  Other salaried position 
  Hourly 
  Other 
 
 
9.  Which of the following best describes your level of education? 
 
  High school or less 
  Some college 
  College graduate 
  Graduate school 
 
 
Section III 
 
These next few questions discuss retirement savings. Please check the appropriate box(es) 
for each of the following questions, and/or fill in the blanks, as appropriate: 
 
10.  First, based on anything you may have heard or read, what percent of your income do 
you think you should ideally be saving for retirement? 
 
  5 percent of income or less 
  Between 5 percent and 9 percent of income 
  Between 10 percent and 14 percent of income 
  Between 15 percent and 19 percent of income 
  Between 20 percent and 24 percent of income 
  At least 25 percent of income 
 
 
11.  Think about how much you are actually currently saving for retirement.  Compare 
your actual saving rate to your ideal saving rate. Right now, your actual retirement saving 
rate is: 
 
  Far too low 
  A little too low 
  About right 
  A little too high 
  Far too high 
 
 
IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO YOUR COMPANY 401(K) PLAN, 
PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 12 THROUGH 17. 
 
IF YOU ARE NOT CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO YOUR COMPANY 401(K) 
PLAN, PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 18. 
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12. Are you contributing currently at the maximum 401(k) savings rate?  
 
  Yes 
  No 
 
 
13.  Which one of the following statements best describes your 401(k) contribution plans 
over the next few months? 
 
  I plan to raise my contribution rate. 
  I plan to lower my contribution rate. 
  I don’t plan to make any changes. 
 
 
IF YOU ARE NOT PLANNING TO MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTION CHANGES, 
PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 15. 
 
 
14. What percent of your salary are you planning to contribute? 
 
 
15. Which one of the following statements best describes your 401(k) fund allocation plans 
over the next few months? 
 
  I am considering selecting different funds. 
  I am considering rebalancing among the funds I currently have. 
  I am not planning to make any changes in regard to my fund allocations. 
  I am considering both selecting different funds and rebalancing among the funds I currently have 
 
 
16. When do you next plan to make changes in your 401(k) plan?   
 
  In the next few days 
  In the next week 
  In the next two weeks 
  In the next three weeks 
  Sometime in the next month 
  Sometime in the next two months 
  Other:  ______________________ 
 
 
17. What company resources will you use to make changes to your 401(k) plan?  Check all 
that apply.   
 
  Speak to benefit center representative or use phone-based “Benefits Express” 
  Use the 401(k) web site: Your Benefits Resources (including advice and education resources, e.g., mPower and 
401Kafe) 
  Consult the new hire kit (given to all new employees) 
  Other: Please specify:  ____________________________________________ 
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IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO YOUR COMPANY 401(K) PLAN, 
PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 21. 
 
IF YOU ARE NOT CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO YOUR COMPANY 401(K) 
PLAN, PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 18 TO 20. 
 
 
18. When you enroll/re-enroll in the XXX Company, Inc. 401(k) plan, what percent of your 
salary do you expect to contribute to the plan? 
 
  Between 0 percent and 3 percent of income  
  Between 4 percent and 6 percent of income 
  Between 7 percent and 9 percent of income 
  Between 10 percent and 12 percent of income 
  Between 13 percent and 15 percent of income 
 
 
19. When do you plan to enroll/re-enroll in the 401(k) plan?   
 
  In the next few days 
  In the next week 
  In the next two weeks 
  In the next three weeks 
  Sometime in the next month 
  Sometime in the next two months 
  Other:  ______________________ 
 
 
20. What company resources will you use to enroll in the 401(k) plan?  Check all that 
apply.   
 
  Speak to benefits center representative 
  Use the 401(k) web site 
  Consult the new hire kit (given to all new employees) 
  Other. Please specify:  ____________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this survey.   
 
For more information on the XXX Company, Inc. 401(k) plan, click here: URL. 
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TABLE 1.  Companies and Their 401(k) Plan Changes or Other Interventions 
 
Company 
 
Industry 
 
Sizea 
Plan Change/  
Intervention 
Date of Change/  
Intervention 
  A Food 10,000 Savings survey January 2001 
  B Office equipment 30,000 Automatic enrollment January 1997 
  C Insurance 30,000 Automatic enrollment 
Financial education seminars 
April 1998 
January-December 2000 
  D Food 20,000 Automatic enrollment January 1998 
  E Utility 10,000 Increased match threshold January 1997 
  F Consumer packaged goods 40,000 Change eligibility 
Instituted employer match 
July 1998 
October 2000 
  G Insurance 50,000 Change eligibility January 1997 
a Number of employees (rounded to the nearest 10,000) on December 31, 2000 (Companies A, B, D, E, F), June 30, 2000 (Company C), or 
December 31, 1999 (Companies G, H). 
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TABLE 2: Self-reported Retirement Savings Adequacy and the  
Distribution of Actual 401(k) Contribution Rates (Company A) 
 
Distribution of 401(k) Contribution Rates 
as a Fraction of Income 
 0%-4% 5%-8% 9%-12% 
Respondents who describe their 
savings rate as “too low” 36% 36% 27% 
    
Respondents who describe their 
savings rate as “about right” 12% 15% 73% 
See question 11 from the survey in Appendix B.  We aggregate the categories “far too low” and “a 
little too low” into one category (‘too low”). 
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 TABLE 3. 401(k) Participation by Tenure Before and After Automatic Enrollment 
 Company B Company C Company D 
 Hire date  Hire date  Hire date  
Before AE 
 
After AE 
After – 
Before 
 
Before AE 
 
After AE 
After – 
Before 
 
Before AE 
 
After AE 
After - 
Before 
Tenure          
  6 months          
          
          
          
          
26.4% 93.4% 67.0% 35.7% 85.9% 50.2% 42.5% 96.0% 53.5%
  12 months 37.8 95.7 57.9 40.2 85.3 45.1 49.6 96.6 47.0
  18 months 47.7 97.0 49.3 44.3 86.0 41.7 56.6 97.2 40.6
  24 months 54.1 97.6 43.5 49.8 85.7 35.9 61.7 99.1 37.4
  30 months 60.0 97.7 37.7 -- -- -- 65.6 98.8 33.3
  36 months 64.7 98.8 34.1 -- -- -- 69.0 100.0 31.0 
The sample for Companies B and C is all 401(k)-eligible employees.  The sample for Company D is 401(k)-eligible employees aged 40+ at the time of hire.  For 
Company D, the data in the “Before AE” column includes only employees not yet subject to automatic enrollment when it was applied to previously hired non-
participants.   For Companies B and D, the first two columns of numbers give the fraction of employees who have ever participated in the 401(k) plan.  For 
Company C, the first two columns give the fraction of employees contemporaneously participating in the 401(k) plan. 
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 TABLE 4.  Fraction of 401(k) Participants at the Automatic Enrollment Default 
 Company B Company C Company D 
Tenure    
  6 months 67.2% 72.6% 54.5% 
  12 months 61.2 59.3 50.9 
  18 months 61.4 47.6 43.7 
  24 months 51.4 39.6 39.5 
  30 months 53.9 -- 39.4 
  36 months 43.6 -- 48.2 
The sample for Companies B and C is 401(k) participants hired after automatic enrollment.  The sample 
for Company D is further restricted to participants aged 40+ at the time of hire. 
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TABLE 5. Employer Matching and 401(k) Participation 
Independent 
Variable 
Company E 
(Hazard ratio) 
Company F 
(Hazard ratio) 
Female 0.8964 
(-1.21) 
1.0237 
(0.45) 
Age 1.1376** 
(3.54) 
1.1480** 
(6.58) 
Age2 0.9985** 
(-3.25) 
0.9984** 
(-5.88) 
Threshold change 0.7976 
(-1.69) 
-- 
Match introduction -- 1.4642** 
(6.84) 
Coefficients estimated from a Cox proportional hazard model of 401(k) participation with time-varying 
covariates.  For Company E, the sample is employees hired during 1996 or 1997 and still employed at 
year-end 1998, 1999 or 2000.  For Company F, the sample is employees hired on or after January 1, 
1998 and still employed at year-end 1998, 1999 or 2000.  In Company E, the variable Threshold change 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the match threshold was raised in Company G (on January 1, 
1997).  In Company F, Match introduction is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the company match 
was announced to employees (on July 1, 2000).  The reported coefficients are hazard ratios, with 
corresponding z-statistics in parentheses.  ** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 
unity at the 1 percent level. 
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TABLE 6.  Financial Education and Actual vs. Planned Savings Changes 
(Company C) 
 Seminar Attendees Non-Attendees 
Planned Action Planned Change Actual Change Actual Change 
Non-participants    
  Enroll in 401(k) plan 100% 14% 7% 
401(k) participants    
  Increase contribution rate 28% 8% 5% 
  Change fund selection 47% 15% 10% 
  Change fund allocation 36% 10% 6% 
The sample is active 401(k)-eligible employees at company locations that offered financial education 
seminars from January-June 2000.  Actual changes in savings behavior are measured over the period 
from December 31, 1999 through June 30, 2000.  Planned changes are those reported by seminar 
attendees in an evaluation of the financial education seminars at the conclusion of the seminar.  The 
planned changes from surveys responses of attendees have been scaled to reflect the 401(k) participation 
rate of seminar attendees. 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3A. 
Balance Size and the Likelihood of a 401(k) Distribution for 
Terminated Employees (Company B) 
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Figure 3B. 
Balance Size and the Likelihood of a 401(k) Distribution for 
Terminated Employees (Company D) 
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Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. 
Employer Matching and 401(k) Participation
(Company F)
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Figure 6. 
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Figure 7A. 
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Figure 7B. 
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